Psychosemantics explores the relation between commonsense psychological Building on and extending Fodor’s earlier work it puts folk psychology on firm. very long manuscript called “Psychosemantics,” and a somewhat of. Mind. ( hence. RTM. ; for discussion see., among other sources.,. Fodor.,. FA. ; Fodor. Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of. Mind Jerry Fodor, as the leading philosophical exponent of cognitive science, has sparked.

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I agree, Adam, that we should reject most of? Maybe I was the one that suggested this was something of a consensus view. These all seem more fine-grained than anything the visual system provides.

We could build a scanner to do this. Nor a Fodor student, Dretske student, Millikan student, or Searle student. This is the problem for philosophers: And we can say this because the most natural causal-explanatory account of the selection of this system mentions objects, not undetached object parts. I look forward to giving the paper the thorough read it deserves.

The latter reflects light similarly to how a detached rabbit liver does.

History of Western Philosophy. I think what Dan says is interesting: I think the same goes for the plover and the rat.

With some sadness and much caution, I suggest that things have not gone well for the Dretske-Fodor program. But I think this has the same problem. Indeed, it is natural to think about it in informational terms.

Fodor – – In William G. Find it on Scholar. By appeal to what the psychologists say? The Quinean indeterminacy issues will arise for these language-like states just as easily as they do for the speech acts of adult human beings.


If naturalized teleosemantics fails, what follows, though? So, let the visual system be an initial producer, then insert an intermediate consumer of the visual system that takes output from the visual system, then responds, then let John use the output of the intermediate consumer. Have I misread the account or are the psychologists wrong or something else? Comments gratefully received… http: Overall, I think the work is quite good, given the empirically impoverished state in which they have been working.

Psychosemantics failed because it addressed only input causality issues. Maybe it was instead just a widely held view. A final somewhat unrelated concern that philosophers specifically should probably worry about: If you work with rats, then you are much more of an authority on their behavior and the studies thereof than I am.

In Models in the Brain too, but easier to find in the article! The retinoid theory of egocentric representation in the brain is this kind of theory that is supported by empirical findings. Do you have a strong intuition that it is highly specific the way we think our linguistic expressions are?

Saying they fail is not say that they having nothing of interest to teach us. If the food is moved by about an inch while the wasp is in the nest, the wasp will move the food back to its original spot and repeat the nest-check subroutine.

Was Psychosemantics a Failure?

For example, the candidate naturalistic relations hold not only between mental states and cows, but also between mental states and the various Pdychosemantics alternatives cow stages, undetached cow parts, etc. Hi Josh, thanks for the follow-up. About your new premise 1: I completely agree that our theories of the mind should be applicable to all creatures.


Also, it seems to me hard to explain rat behavior without supposing that rats wonder whether p. What I am suggesting is that the relation of teleosemantics with ethology it is not as analogous to, say, the philosophy of time with fundamental physics as one may think.

Jerry A. Fodor, Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind – PhilPapers

This seems like a perfectly sound naturalistic, selectionist account of how the detectors came to be. All we can do is point to anything that might make content more specific in this psychosmantics. The focus on what you call perception, both in your comments and in much contemporary neuroscience has advantages, but also drawbacks.

And, for all I know. Now, in truth, unlike you. Gibsonians are in denial about, for just one example, the challenge they face in dealing with visual illusions.

I believe they are. The flexibility of their behavior leads us to posit psychsoemantics in the rat that go well beyond simple detection and sensory-motor connections.

You might block counterexamples at the price of vacuity. For example, a rabbit and an undetached rabbit liver reflect light rather differently.